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dPo,  Plnnft  n  Am 
Inamtwntnal  Commodity Mfiarkets
In the case of semi-subsistence agdculture  responded to changes in relative expected prices,
where wage employment is not available, the  iand availability, level of household demand,
role played by prices and taxes in determining  and sowing period rainfalL Production of teff,
production and consumption decisions is not  wheat, chick peas, and sorghum was found to
clearly established by economic theories of  increase with higher prices, and production of
household choice. This study demonstrates that  field peas was found to fall.  Evidence suggests
where choices in production, consumption, and  that expandinf  the amount of arable land will
leisure can be made independently, farmers will  raise farmers' output of wheat, chick peas,
decide what to grow on the basis of their prefer-  maize, and sorghum.
ences for marketed goods, and will also be
affected by the level and type of taxation.  These results give strong evidence of the
role of producer and consumer prices in semi-
The model shows the impact of four taxes  subsistence agriculture.  In additior, the results
agricultural revenue, land (either a head tax  show the importance of production capacity,
or a tax based on land area), pro'iuction, and  household demand, and climatic factors, sup-
marketed goods consumption - on crop pro-  porting a balanced approach to agricultural
duction and tax revenues.  The results demon-  development that recognizes the joint roles of
strated that a production tax curailed  output  prices, production capacity, and demand.
while a lump-sum land tax expanded production.
The impact of a tax on agricultural revenue or on  This paper is a product of the Intemational
products sold in the market depends on the  Commodity Markets Division, Intemational
faTners' preferences for marketed goods.  Economics Department.  Copies are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
For Ethiopia, a model of production was  Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Dawn
estimated for eight food crops for semi-subsis-  Gustafson, room S7-044, extension 33714.
tence households.  In general, production
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The potential  role  of prices  and taxes  in  agricultural  development
strategies  has been  recognized  in an emerging  literature  focused  on various
cas,h  crops.  However,  less is known about the semi-subsistence  case where
agriculture  represents  the  sole  source  ot income  and  food  crops  can  be either
held  for  home  consumption  or  sold  for  income  that  can  be  used  for  purchase  of
consumer  goods.  In the  presence  of a  wage  market,  the  role  of prices  or  taxes
in  determining  crop  production  is simplified  by the  well-known  independence  of
production  and consumption  decisions.  Where  wage markets  do not exist,  the
production  and consumnption  decisions  are simultaneous  and their  response  to
prices  has  been  recognized  to be  indeterminant  in ;ign.  The  objectives  of this
paper  are  to (1)  reconsider  this  general  case  of semi-subsistence  agriculture
and identify  the  determinants  of the  qualitative  nature  of choice  response;
(2) establish  the impacts  of alternative  agricultural  taxes  on production
levels  and responsiveness;  and  (3)  for  the  case  of Ethiopia  (1961-78)  presenr
results  concerning  price  responsiveness  of food  crop  production  and  the  likely
effects  of alternative  taxes.-2-
II.  TED  SfI-SUBSISTCKE OUSKSOLD
The  Choice  Problem
The  semi-subsistence  household  is  characterized  by a choice  problem
in which household  preferences  exist over leisure  (S), the level of home
consumption  of farm output (Q), and the level of consumption  of market
purchased  goods (C). Preferences  are conditional  on a vector  of household
characteristics  a and are  represented  by  a  monotonic,  twice-continuously
differentiable,  strictly  concave  utility  function:
(1)  U =  U (S,  Q, C; a)  where U'(-)  > O,  U  <  O.
Food production  (Y) results  from combination  of household  labor  (L)  with a
vector  e of fixed  levels  of services  of such  inputs  as land  or draft  power.
The  technology  is  represented by  a  monotonic,  twice-continuously
differentiable,  strictly  convex  production  function:
(2) C(Y,  L,  e)  - 0  where Cy  >  O,  GL  <  °
Cyy  (  O  GLL  >  0,  L >  0
The  household  is  assumed  to control  L,  Q, and  C in  order  to  maximize  utility
subject  to  a full  income  constraint:
(3)  PCC +  PQ  +  T  PY
and  a time  constraint:
(4)  L + S  S H-3-
where  H  represents  total  available  household  time,
PC  and  P represent  market  prices,  and
T represents  taxes  paid.
This representation  of the choice  problem  differs  from Makajima's
(1969)  semi-subsistence  model  where  preferences  were  assumed  over leisure  and
income.  Here,  we focus  on commodities,  nct  income  as the  source  of utility.
Althougi we  employ scalar interpretations  of  Y,  L,  C,  and  Q,  their
interpretation  as vectors  would not change  our results.  Rosensweig  (1980)
considered  a  household  model  in  which  a  vector  interprctation  of  L was  used  to
analyze male  versus female roles. The  inclusion  of  taxes will  allow
consideration  of the  impact  of  alternative  taxes  on choices  as well  as  choice
response.
Summarizing  the  choice problem in  Lagrangean form, we  have
maximized:
U(S,  Q,  C;  v)  +  XI(PY-PC  PQ-T)  +  k)2  (Y,  H-S,  0)
Assuming an  interior solution  ezists for all  choices, the  first-order
conditions  necessary  for  solution  of  the  choice  problem  are:
us  2a5  0
uQ  ).1P  0
UC  x1pc  °
XIP  X2Gy  O0
(5)  PY  - - PQ  - T  0  O
C (Y,  1-S;  0)  =  0-4-
Comparative-Statics
This system  of implicit  choice  functions  presents  the basis for
analyzing the  responsiveness  of  semi-subsistence  agrarian households  to
changes  in  policy  controls  such  as prices,  taxes,  and  size  of landholding.
Total  differentiation  of  the  system  results  in:
SS + x cS  u  u  G  0  C  dS
SS  2  Ss  SQ  SC  2 SY  S
UQS  uQQ  uQC  °  O  dQ
Ucs  u  CQ  ucc  0  -Pc  0  dC
'2  YS  0  0  A2CYY  P  Cy  dY
(6)  0  -P  PC  P  0  d
CS  0  0  Cy  0  0  d2
0  0  dP
O  1  0  dT
-x  0  0 -1
Q-Y  C  I
0  0  0
Solutions  of (6)  for  the  comparative-static  changes  in choice  consistent  with
(5)  will  be considered  individually.Solution  of (6)  results  in the  following  prediction  of agricultural
output  supply  response  to  a  change  in  its  price:
(7)  BY  = (PC IH  Li  4144  + (Y-Q)  PC  IHS
(7)  (S  1124  - II54)¶
where  H is the  bordered  Hessian  matrix  on the  left-hand  side  of (6),  1H|ij  is
'to 'ith  cofactor,  and IH|  is its determinanL.  By assumption  of strict
concavity  of  U(*)  and strict  convexity  of  C(-),  we have IHI  >  0. However,
inspection  of the cofactors  involved  in (7) suggests  that the sign of the
numerator  is ambiguous.  This type  of result  was also  suggested  by  analysis  by
Nakajima  as  well  as  Rosentweig,  and  follows  a long  tradition  of  recognition  of
the  possibility  of backward  bending  supply.  However,  it is  possible  to obtain
sharper  insight  than  offered  by these  earlier  papers  into  the  factors  which
determine  the  sign  of comparative-statics  such  as (7).
The complexity  of the  general  case  can be seen  from the  cofactors
involved  in (7),  e.g.,
(8)  22  p  S  P  c  P  C2u  +  P2C  us H 1 H 24 =  P scc  C  SY  SC  C  SCQ  C  SY  SQ
while  Ucc  < 0 as a result  of strict  concavity,  the  signs  of  US,  UCQI  and  USQ
depend  on whether  S, C and  Q are substitutes  or complements.  Suppose  C is a
substitute  for  Q, i.e.,  UCQ  <  0 and  leisure  (S)  is  a complement  to  consumption
of either  C or Q, then  Usc  > 0 and  USQ  > 0. The sign  of 1H124  would  remain
ambiguous.  Only in the  case  in  which  C and  Q are  complements,  and  Usc  and  USQ
differ  in sign  with  Usc > 0  would  th.  sign  of IH241 be determinant.  The same
type  of conclusions  follow  from  consideration  of IH144  and Ih154, rendering
the  determination  of the  sign  of (7)  an  empirical  issue.Greater  insight  into the sign of supply  response  can be gained
without  unreasonable  loss  of  consistency  with  observed  systems  by simplifying
the total  differential  system  (6)  using  the  assumption  of group-wise  weakly
separable  preferences  across  S, C, and  Q. In the vector  case,  this implies
that  preferences  over  S,  C,  and  Q satisfy  the  condition  that  marginal  rates  of
substitution  for  within  group  elements  are independent  of levels  of elements
of other  groups,  see  Greene  (1974).  In fact,  these  conditions  are sufficient
for  equivalant  representation  of U(-)  as a function  of vectors  S, C, and  Q by
an alternative  representation  where 8, C, and Q are interpreted  as index
numbers  or aggregates  of the  elements  in their  respective  vector  forms.  Most
important for  simplification  of  comparative-statics  such as  (7),  the
separebility  assumption  implies  UCQ - Usc =  USQ =  0. Under  this  assumption,
(7)  becomes
(9)  ay_  2  )P 2U  ~JI
3p = -[UcPcGsUQQ  +  (Y'Q)  PC  QQucc J/1H
While  this assumption  turns our focus to a  more specialized  case, the
assumption  has  been  accepted  as sufficiently  consistent  with  observed  systems
to justify  its  adoption  in  empirical  studier  by Barnum  and Squire  (1979),  Ahn
Singh,  and Squire  (1980).  While  the presence  of a labor  market  establishes
independence  of production  from  consumption  decisions,  the  present  assumption
preserves  the  simultaneity  of  choice  among  8,  C,  and  Q aggregates,  and  implies
only  that  within-group  choices  (i.e.,  within  elements  of the  vectors  S,  c.,  and
Q) be independent.
Although  the  sign  of (9)  remains  ambiguous,  insight  to its  variation
can now be obtained.  Given |H, >  0, by strict  concavity  of U and strict
convexity of G(*),  the  sign of  the comparative-static  depends on  whether-7-
(10)  U-C  >  (y  p  )
cc<  c
This  result  suggests  the  following  intuitively  useful  rule:
(11)  By  >  0  as-ZE  C  u
where
aloguc
EC  alogC  is  the  elasticity  of  U..  or  marginal  subjective
value  of C to  changes  in  C,  and
-- Pc/P(Y-Q)  is  the market expenditure  share  of market,
or  cash  income.
The  rule  in  (11)  suggests  that  production  response  is  dependent  upon
characteristics  of preferences  for  market-originating  consumption  goods,  and
is  independent  of  the  characteristics  of  production  technology.  If  we
interpret ec  as the  elasticity  of subjective  marginal  value  of  C, the "I  as
the  real  market  exchange  rate  between  C  and  marketed  surplus  (Y-Q),  then  the
rule  establishes  that  production  response  is  positive  if  at  current  levels  of
L,  Q, and  C, the  elasticity  of  subjective  marginal  value  of  C resulting  from  a
change  in the  level  of C is less  than  the  market's  valuation  of amount  of C
obtainable  for  additional  marketed  surplus.
In addition  to  technology  and  preferences  which  determine  the  left-
hand side  of (11),  the  existence  and  nature  of taxes  influence  the  nature  of
supply  response  by their  effect  on the  right-hand  side  of (11).  By use  of the
budget  constraint  where  T is  a consumption  tax,  i.e., T =  Y  ,  (11)  can  be- 8 -
further  simplified  in order  to  highlight  the  dependence  of  the  Libn of  aYl3P
on  the  functional  properties  of  U(.), and  the  nature  of taxation,  i.e.,
(12)  ay - °  as  -c  :  ./l  +y
When  y  = 0, the  condition  relies  on  -C c  1.  In this  form  the effect  of a
tax  can  be isolated  as  an expansion  of the  range  of  elasticity  -c  --r whi.h
positive  supply  response  could  be found.  Before  proceeding  to cor. "er  other
comparative-static  results, it  is  of  interest to  consider the  sign
of aYIaP  over  the  range  of C and  for  different  characteristics  of utility.  In
general,  c  is a  function  of C  and  for a  particular  form of  U(-),  the
consumption  level Cs  at which  aY/3P  changes sign is determined  as the
solution  of  -ec  j  u.  For example,  for the quadratic  form:
U(C)  A C  +  BC 2
we have
(13)  C  =  -A/(4B  + 2By)
As  also  noted  from  (12),  the  switch  point  Co  depends  on  the  level  of  taxation,
U"(C)  and  U'(C).  From  Figure  1 it  is clear  that  for  a  given  utility  function,
as  y  increases, the range [0,  Co1 over which  aY/aP  <  0  is  reduced. For
y =  0,  C5 is indicated  by the .,sumption  level  corresponding  to  -cc m 1.
The lower  horizontal  line  in Figure  1 is  consistent  with  y  a  0.15.  Further,
as indicated  in  Figure  1,  Co increases  as  -UCC/UC  and  B/A  decreases.  Recalling
that CO  indicates  the level of consumption  above which positive supply
response  can  be expected,  Figure  1 illustrates  that  increases  in  a  consumptiontax such as  y  decrease;  C9, increasing  the range  over which a positive
supply  response  would  be  expected.  Empirically,  the  magnitude  of  this  shift  in
Cs  depends  upon  the  shape  of  preferences.
Where  preferu-ces  are  characterized  by rapidly  diminishing  marginal
utility,  increases  in  T (increases  in  y)  can  be  expected  to  be less  effective
in  leading  to  a switch  to positive  price  responsiveness.  However,  where  UCC  is
small,  a more  significant  shift  in  C5 can  be  expected.  In  general,  for  a given
T, Figure  1 illustrates  that  -here  preferences  have relatively  more rapidly
declining  marginal  utility,  i.e.,  larger  UCC, the range  [0,  Cs] is reduced,
making  it more likely  that  8Y/IP  > 0  could  be expected.  Similar  results
occur  in  the  general  nonlinear  case.
Alternative  forms  of  tax  T have  effect  on  these  general  results  only
through  their  effect  on  p.  For a consumption  tax,  p  =/tl  +  y)  and  )  is
horizontal  in  (cc,C)  space.  In  the  case  of  a  lump-sum  tax,
p  =  PcC/(PcC  +  T) and  p  varies  nonlinearly  with  C  with  a positive  slope.  In
general,  a  lump-sum  tax can be shown to result in a  smaller range of
consumption  over  which  supply  response  will  be  negative.  This  property  of  p
is illustrated  in  Figure  1  with  a(C).  The extent  of this  reduction  in  Cs is
an empirical  issue;  however,  it can be shown  that if Cs is to be reduced
significantly  the tax would  have to claim  a significant  percentage  of the
household  budget.  In  the  case  illustrated,  the  tax  T initially  accounts  for  25
percent  of  the  budget.  Finally,  in  this  simple  illustrative  case  the  effect  of
changes  in Q and S can  be conceptualized  as vertical  shifts  in the  graph  vf
-EC  Suppose  Q and  C are  substitutes,  then  increases  in  Q could  be expected
to  reduce  Ucc  and %C,  leaving  the  net  effect  on  -e  uncertain.  Where  Q and  C
are complements,  an increase  in  Q might  be  expected  to increase  both  UCC  and
UC,  leaving  the  effect  on  -Cc  uncertain.FIG URE  1: DEPENDENCE  OF SUPPL Y RESPONSE
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Further  comparative-statics  may  be  derived  from  (6)  and  in  all  cases
their  signs  are indeterminant.  Nonetheless,  a similar  strategy  of examination
of the variation  of their  signs  can  be taken.  Since  labor  is the  only input
and  is  assumed  to  have positive  marginal productivity,  the  signs of
BY/DP and  aL/aP  are  jointly determined  and  are  the  same. However, the
production  response  to changes  in consumption  goods  is more complicated  and
worth  consideration.  From  (6),
Y  UCpp  C2U  *CpUCG 2U  >,11
aP  P  C  L QQ  CCLuQQ  )/  1HI <  o
(14)
as  (Uc  +  CUcc)  0
or  u  CU
From  the  budget  constraint, and  assuming a  consumption tax  where
T - yP  C, we  have  C - P(Y-Q)/Pc(I  +  y)  allowing
(15)  ay  >  UC  >  P(Y-Q) (1)  - - as  --  _
For  any  nonnegative  Y,  it  follows  from  (10)  that
(16)  BY/9P  >  0  as  aY/aP  ;>  0.
Before  proceeding,  it is of interest  to note that the household
theory  leaves  indeterminant  the  implications  of changes  in  m, the  demographic- 12 -
characteristics  of the  household  and  0,  fixed  production  factors.  For  example,
by allowing  these factors  to vary exogenously,  solution  of a generalized
version  of the  total  differential  (6)  would  indicate  that  the  sign  of  WYe8a
would depend on  (1)  Us,  UQas  S  the change induced in the marginal
utilities  of alternative  choices,  (2) UCC, and (3) Gy and G8. In a more
generalized  problem  this result  suggests  that  BY/Bo  would  be determined
through  the interplay  of marginal  productivities  of labor  across  crops  anfu
changes  in marginal  utilities  induced.  If  a  is interpreted  as the  scale  of
household  demand,  then  the  indeterminacy  of an increase  in  a  on production
of alternative  crops would be reflected  by a change  in the mix of crops
produced  that  would  be consistent  with  the  differing  labor  intensities  of the
crops,  and  preferences  for  home  consumption  of  the  crops.- 13  -
III.  THE  ECOECKICS  OF TAXATION  OF SDUI-SIJDISTBNCE  BOUSEUOLDS
The above  results  provide  a solid  foundation  for analysis  of the
impacts  of  alternative  taxes  on the  semi-subsistence  tousehold.  The  focus  here
will  be on the  impact  of alternative  taxes  on the  le-.al  of production  (Y)  and
tax  revenue  (T).  The  following  taxes  are  considered:
1.  Agricultural  Revenue  Tax:  T  6P(Y-Q)
2.  Lump-sum  Land  Tax:  T = tO
3.  Transportation  Tax:  T - rY
4.  Consumption  Tax:  T - yP  C
Before  proceeding,  alternative  interpretations  of these  taxes  should  be  noted.
The  lump-sum  tax  could  be  generated  by  a  tax  on  any  asset  fixed  in  the
production  period,  e.g.,  'a¾nd  area  occupied  or  family  size  as  in  a  head  tax.
The  transportation  tax,  perhaps  generated  by  a  tax  on fuel  or road  tolls,  will
be  seen  to  separate  the  unit  revenue  price  of  production  from  that  of  home
consumption.  In  this  sense,  such  taxes  represent  production  taxes  rather  than
marketing  taxes  as in the  case  of  agricultural  revenue  taxes.  The  consumption
tax considered  focuses  on marketed  products  only.  An alternative  would  be to
tax  all  consumption,  e.g., y((PcC  + PQ). The  operational  difficulties  of such
a tax  suggest  it  is  of little  interest.
The following  comparative-statics  are derived  from the  alternative
taxes:
ay  ay  P  > o  as  -E  (
__6  7p  >-  - as  <- 14  -
aY _ aY o 
at  are-  if  IHI  >o
By  ay PC  as  9a  >  O,  or a  pPC  <BC 
as -EC > 1/Cl4y)
The  effect  of the transportation  tax  requires  generalization  of the  model  to
separate  the  market  revenue  value  of production  from  its faragate  value  (P).
We define  Py  as the  market  price.  The  effect  of a transport  or production  tax
is to reduce  the market  price  to  (1  - i)  P  *  The  comparative-statics  of
choice  for  the  generalized  problem  are  as  follows:
By  U(UcucCP  2c  /PC)  UQQPCG 2 u  u Yp  2  > 0 ap y  c  CC  C  QQ  C a  QQUCCYPG
ay  ~2  2 >
i-D=  (UCUccP  Gs/PC)  QQ  UCCQPGs
as  -C  C/ ^  c  >  C/
It follows,  aYaT  =  (UcuccP 2 G/PC)  +  Upc2  - u  ti  YPC21  P < 0 cuccp  QQ  C a  QQ  CCYPG8
These results illustrate  the differing  impacts  of alternative  tases.  The
impacts  on production  vary in sign.  In the  case of the revenue  tax  and the
consumption  tax the  sign depends on  preferences  as  sumrized  in  ec*  A
transportation  tax, or equivalently  a production  tax,  unequivocally  reduces
production  while  the  lump-sum  tax  expands  production.- 15  -
In the small  country  case  considered,  tax revenues  are defined  in
the  absence  of price  changes.  The  question  of  optimality  of a tax  arises  only
from  production  response  to the  tax.  Taxes  which  optimize  revenue  are  defined
by the  following  rules:
P(-  Q)  aQ  Q  py  ay  1
a6  Ry  -- =1W6
T:  T  -1
v:  ac  7 . -1
In each case, choices  respond  to changes  in the tax rate and the optimum
occurs  depending  on the  sign  and  curvature  of choice  response.  The  monotonic
response  of production  to a lump-sum,  or asset-based  tax  such  as land  tax t,
implies  an optimum  does  not  exist.- 16  -
IV.  ENPIRIChL  IHPLIC&TIOUS  MD BVIDECE FROM  ETHIOPIA
The  above  theoretical  model  of  smallbolder  choices  suggests  that  the
magnitude  of response  is an empirical  question.  Further,  the theory  clearly
establishes  the  roles  of farm  prices,  transportation  costs,  consumption  goods
prices, and  exogenous factors affecting agricultural  productivity  and
conditioning  household  preferences.  The impacts  of alternative  taxes were
illustrated  to depend  on choice  response  to market  prices,  suggesting  that
infere.  -es  concerning  tax policy  could be derived  from empirical  evidence
concerning  choice  response.  The  implications  of the  theory  developed  above  are
evaluated  using  the  experience  of Ethiopia  from  1961  to 1978.  Before  1961  very
little  data are available,  while  after 1978,  publication  of price  data was
discontinued, but  more  importantly, parastatal marketing  dominated
agriculture.
General  Background
The production  of food  crops  in Ethiopia  increased  by 29 percent
between  1960  and 1980  or  at an average  annual  rate  of  only  1.4  percent,  while
the  population  increased  by 58  percent-equivalent  to  an  average  annual  growth
rate of 2.5 percent (see Table 1). Yields  remained  stagnant  but imports
increased  dramatically  though  not  enough  to  offset  declines  in  the  per  capita
food production  (18 percent),  per capita  caloric  intake  (17 percent)  and
protein  (18  percent).
Unfavorable  weather  conditions  contributed  to the poor performance
of crop production,  particularly  during  the mid-seventies;  however,  poor
weather  and  other  limitations  imposed  by  the  natural  environment  cannot
explain  entirely  the  slow  growth  over  the  whole  period. Part  of  the  poor- 17  -
Table  1:  SOME  INDICATORS  OF THE ETHIOPIAN  AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR  PERFORMANCE
1960  1970  1980
Food Production  Index (1969/71  =  100)  82  101  106
Yield  (cereals)  kg/ha  835  868
Population  ('000)  20,000  25,400  31,464
Index  of  Food  Production  Per  Capita
(1969/71  =  100)  103  101  84
imports  (cereals)  ('000)  6  77  397
Per  Capita  Supplies  of Calories
(Z  of Requirement)  91  83  76
Per  Capita  Supplies  of Proteins  (grams/day)  72  69  eg
Source: Central  Statistical  Office,  Statistical  Abstracts.
production  record  has  been  due  to transition  from  a feudalistic  tenure  system,
inadequate  production  technology,  poor infrastructure,  inefficient  markets,
inappropriate  marketing  policies  and  internal  turmoil.
Smallholders  dominate  Ethiopian  agriculture  as well as the entire
economy  [FAO  (1984)].  They  provide  a living  for  7  million  families  which  make
up over 80  percent of  the population.  They utilize 94 percent of the
cultivated  land and  produce  90 percent  of the  agricultural  output--including
most  food  crops  and  coffee.  The  principal  food  crops  are:  teff,  barley,  wheat,
horse  beans,  chick  peas  and  field  peas.
The sector  comprises  several  production  systems,  but the highland
mixed  farming  system  is the  dominant  one [Getahun  (1978)1.  The average  farm- 18 -
family  operates  a farm of 1.5  ha which  is highly  fragmented  lGryseels  and
Anderson  (1981)1.  At planting  time the seedbed  is generally  prepared  with
indigenous  ox-drawn  plows.  Weeding  is  done  with  hoes  or  bare  hands  while  crops
are  harvested  wi'th  sickle  and  threshed  by oxen  which  trample  on the  ears  *nd
legumes  until  the  grains  and  beans  drop  out.  The  farm  work  is  almost  entirely
done with family  labor.  Farm machinery,  improved  seeds  and herbicides  are
seldom  used  and the  application  of fertilizers  is limited.  Soil  fertility  is
maintained  with the occasional  application  of  livestock  manure and crop
rotation  in which  generally  three  or four  years  of cereals  is followed  by a
year  of legumes.
Although  these  production  systems  have  nct  changed  dramatically,  the
tenure  and  the  market  systems  were  restructured  by  the  new  government  in  1975.
Before  that date most of the land  was worked  by peasants  either  as owner-
farmers  or farmed  by tenants;  and  the  commerce  was  in the  hands  of  merchants.
According  to a survey  undertaken  just  before  the reform,  36 percent  of the
farm holdings  was operated  by tenants,  38 percent  by private  owners, 15
percent  was partly  owned  and rented,  while  the  remaining  11 percent  of the
holdings  was  under  communal  ownership  [FAO  (1984)l.  After  the  land  reform  of
1975,  all land was nationalized,  land was redistributed  from the limited
number  of large  commercial  farms to state farms  and peasant  associations
(OPAs),  usufructuary  rights  were awarded  to the farmers,  and in order to
enforce  the redistribution  of land  and mobilize  resources,  incentives  were
established  to  encourage  the  organization  of  OPAs.
Crop  marketing  during  the  1960s  and  1970s  was  handled  by  private
traders  in  central  village  markets,  but  the  role  of  the  government  in  the
market  was significantly  increased  in 1976  when  a marketing  state  agency--The- 19  -
Agricultural  Marketing  Corporation  (AMC)--was  created.  This corporation  has
broad  powers  to buy  and sell  cereals,  pulses  and  oilseeds,  and  to import  and
export  agricultural  commodities.  Another  state  agency,  the  Agricultural  Input
Marketing Corporation (AIMCO) was  empowered  with  the  procurement  and
distribution  of fertilizers  and  chemicals.  Before  the  land  reform,  credit  was
provided  to the  peasants  mostly  by landlords  and  money  lenders.  Following  the
reform,  credit is offered  by thie  Agricultural  Industrial  Development  Bank
(AIDB)  and  AMC  through  the  state  commercial  banks  to  OPAs.
Despite  the profound  transformations  in the tenure  and the market
structure,  the basic characteristics  of the subsector  have by and large
remained  unchanged:  the average  size of the smallholdings  is very close  to
that  of  the  pre-revolutionary  period. Production technology remains
traditional,  the farming  family  still  provides  all the farm  work, consumes
about 70 percent  of its produce  and makes  production  choices  with limited
resources  in  a capricious  natural  environment.
The bulk of the food  crops  is produced  by peasants  with small  and
fragmented  holdings,  using simple  hand implements  and ox-drawn  plows,  and
growing  mainly  unimproved low-yield varieties. The  basic  physical
infrastructure  is poorly  developed.  Beyond  the vicinity  of the major urban
centers,  the  road  network  is either  nonexistent  or inadequate,  rendering  the
transportation  of agricultural  produce  and inputs  over even short  distances
uneconomical.  Such  high  transportation  costs  have  inhibited  the  development  of
regionally  and  nationally  integrated  markets  and  led  to  uncompetitive,  small,
isolated  markets  with  the  consequence  of  reduced  incentives  to farmers.
Changes in  policy designed to  improve the  performance  of  the
smallholder  sector depend upon knowledge  of the  sign and magnitude of- 20 -
production responses to  policy and  exogenous changes in  the  economic
environment.  Of  particular interest  are  (1)  the  own- and  cross-price
elastticities  of subsistence  food  crops,  and  cash  crops;  and (2)  the  relative
importance  of prices  versus  fixed  factors,  of production  or determinants  of
subsistence  food  demand.  The  period  prior  to 1978  offers  a case  for  study  of
the  potential  response  of  smallholders  to  changes  in  prices  and  fixed  factors,
and  therefore  data  for  the  period  1961-78  are  employed  in the  empirical  model.
Empirical  Evidence
The empirical  analysis  focuses  on five  cereals--teff,  wheat,  barley,
sorghum,  and  maize-and three  pulse  crops--chick  peas,  field  peas,  and  horse
beans--which  accounted  for  over 90Z  of cereal  and pulse  production  in 1974.
Further,  available  data  indicate  that  production  of these  crops  was  dominated
by smallholders.  The  crops  were grown  principally  in the central  highlands;
over  50 percent  of maize  and sorghum,  and  about  80 percent  of the  other  crops
were  grown  there.
The empirical  implications  of the  theory  developed  above  are  limited
to the identification  of: (1)  relative  expected  crop  prices;  (2)  measures  of
scale  of  fixed  production  factor  flows;  and  (3)  measures  of fixed  determinants
of the scale  of household  subsistence  food  demand  as determinants  of planned
production  levels  of  smallholder  crops.  Significantly,  theory  does  not  suggest
a partial  adjustment  model.  In the  absence  of any  prior  theory  or evidence
concerning  the functional  form  of the  smallholder  choice  functions  derivable
from  (5),  we  adopt  linear  forms:
(17)  Y*  =  + P  ei+  L  Yi +  PeA  +  Ht i.  R  a (17 tY 60  t  i  t  t  i  t  . ti  i- 21 -
where  Yit  is  the  planned  output  of crop  i  in  year  t;
Pe  is  a (1  x  m) vector  of relative  (CPI  deflated)  expected  crop
t
prices;
Lt  is arable  land;
Ht  is  agricultural  population;
Rti  is average  sowing  period  rainfall  for  crop  i;  and
A  is  binary  equal  to  zero  prior  to land  reform  in  1975.
We define  estimated  production:
(18)  =  Yt  D  La  it
where  Dt  is a  vector of two binary variables indicating  charges in
estimation  method  by the  CSO  in 1963  and 1972  (prior  to these  dates
Dk  =  0), and
i  ;is an  i.i.d.  random  variable  with E(eit)  =  0, E(£it£jt)  =
for  all  i.j  and  E(  itejt,)  =  0  for  all  t#t'.
Arable  land (L)  is employed  as a measure  of agricultural  production  capaci.y
which  is  fixed within the production  period. The  scale of  household
subsistence  demand  is  measured  by  agricultural  population.  It is important  to
note the theoretical  motivation  for this factor  lies in its microeconomic
origin  as a measure  of household  food  demand.  Given  this definition,  it is
distinguished  from  population  density  considered  by the  Boserup  hypothesis.
Data  are  described  in  more  detail  in an appendix  available  from  the
authors.  However,  in  brief,  production  levels  were  collected  from  the  Central
Statistical  Offices  (CSO)  Statistical  Abstracts  which  report  estimates  based- 22  -
on  a  synthesis  of  small surveys and  estimates of  exports and  local
consumption.  Wholesale  prices  for products  in selected  towns  of the major
producing  areas,  as reported  in Statistical  Abstracts,  were  employed.  Average
annual and average crop-specific  growing season rainfall  estimates  were
computed  using  monthly  average  data  for  eight  weather  stations  in the  central
highl1snds.  Agricultural  population  estimates  and arable  land size  estimates
were  taken  from  the  FAO  Production  Yearbook.
In order  to proceed,  price  expectations  must  be modeled.  Although  a
naive  or adaptive  model  might  be assumed,  we adopt  the  hypothesis  that  past
prices  will be used  efficiently  to construct  expectations,  see  Weaver  (1977,
1981).  The adoption  of this hypothesis  supports  the use of identified  and
estimated  ARIMA  models  as summarized  in  Table  2.  In  general,  the  ARIKA  results
support  very simple  models of price expectations  and do not support  the
adaptive  expectation  fo;m.  Instead,  results  indicate  the  adaptive  expectation
model would provide systematically  biased  forecasts  that do not minimize
forecast  error.  If we assume Pt  E(P.  )  - V.  and that the measurement
It  it  itI
error  Vit is independent  of the determinants  of production,  then  unbiased,
efficient  estimates  of the  parameters  in the  model  (17)  can  be estimated  with
the  Zellner  (1962)  efficient  estimator.
Table  3 presents  parameter  estimates  of the  eight  equations  in (17),
while  Table  4 reports  the  own-  and  cross-price  elasticities  for  pre-  and  post-
land reform  periods.  The coefficient  of determination  (R 2) ranges  from 0.70
for  field peas to 0.87 for teff, which indicates  that the  independent
variables  have  good  explanatory  power.  This is  supported  by the  high  value  of
the P-statistic  which is a measure  of the extent  to which the explanatory
variables  are  related  with  the  independent  variable.- 23  - ,
Table  2t  ESTIMATED  MRIIA NOD8LS  POR  THE  PRICE SERIES
OF CROPS  AMD  CONSUMER  PRICE  INDEX
Price  Series  Model  x2a  Prob>X  Stdc
Teff  P  nl.O+u  3.89  0.69  4.41
t  t
wheat  P  *1.5+u  5.43  0.49  3.27
t  t
Barley  P  =2.2+u  4.86  0.56  2.51
t  t
Sorghum  P  nu  17.69  0.01  3.86
t  t
maise  P  Ou  11.21  0.08  3.49
t  t
Chick  peas  P  -u  7.84  0.25  4.12
t  t
Field  peas  P  W1.59+.Su  +u  4.98  0.44  3.45
t  t-l  t
;3.67)  e  (2.36)
Horse  beans  P  1.10+.7u  eu  6.82  0.15  3.45
(0.67)  (3.12)
cPIf  P =9.44-.7u  *u  3.19  0.52  12.07
42.0)  (3.791
a  Estimated  Chi-squared  for  a  Q-statistic  with  six  lags.
b  Probability  that  x2 is  greater  than  the  estimated  value.
c  Standard  error.
d  p  _  p  - p
t  t  t-1
C  The  figures  in  parenthesis  are  t-ratios.
f  Consumer  price  index.- 24  -
Table  3:  SEEMINGLY  UNRELATED  REGRESSION  (SUR)  ESTIMATES
OF THE OITPULT  CHOICE  EQUATIONS
Choice  Equation
Independent  Variable  Teff  Wheat  Barley
Constant  3866.60  -2788.72  -1693.40
(3.90)a  (-3.27)  (-0.87)
Price  of:
Teff  59.90  -23.14  -22.81
(4.43)  (-2.48)  (-1.17)




Arable  land  0.01  0.27  0.09
(0.07)  (2.20)  (0.32)
Agricultural  population  -0.14  -0.01  0.04
(-2.02)  (-0.24)  (0.31)
Sowing  period  rainfalla  0.25  0.97  2.93
(0.35)  (1.74)  (2.22)
Di  -27.86  -14.10  162.87
(0.20)  (-0.14)  (0.74)
D2  -74.82  -166.36  -670.00
(-0.75)  (-1.85)  (-3.22)
D3  15.45  -6.69  -2.65
(2.24)  (-0.92)  (-0.1')
Post-reform  own  price  75.35  24.77  -0.57
(4.83)  (2.01)  (-0.02)
R2  0.87  0.86  0.80
F  10.02  9.35  7.00
Prob>F  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
.... Continued- 25  -
Table  3 continued...
Choice  Equation
Independent  Variable  Chick  peas  Field  peas  Horse  beans
Constant  -181.76  3.50  -272.23
(-1.31)  (-0.03)  (-1.56)
Price  of:
Wheat  -11.31  6.22
(-2.09)  (1.18)
Chick  peas  4.92  0.39
(1.84)  (0.29)
Field  peas  -3.40
(-1.31)
Horse  beans  7.29
(1.39)
Agricultural  population  -0.03  0.004  0.03
(-2.37)  (0.51)  (1.93)
Sowing  period  rainfall  0.15  0.14  0.13
(1.21)  (1.85)  (1.47)
Arable  land  0.08  0.001  -0.04
(3.37)  (0.05)  (-1.16)
D2  -7.12  -40.75
(-0.34)  (-2.76)
D 3 -4.67  0.22  7.17
(-2.86)  (0.20)  (2.49)
Post-reform  own  price  0.25  -3.18  14.46
(0.09)  (-1.20)  (2.41)
R2 0.82  0.70  0.86
F  7.18  5.09  5.70
Prob>F  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
... Continued- 26 -
Table  3  continued...
Choice  Equation
Independent  Variable  Maize  Sorghum
Constant  -657.22  -397.49
(-1.31)  (-0.52)
Price  of:
Maize  -7.50  -41.75
(-0.43)  (-2.63)
Sorghum  8.58  31.64
(0.59)  (2.34)
Arable  land  0.31  0.22
(3.57)  (1.93)
Agricultural  population  -0.12  -0.06
(-2.87)  (-1.27)






D3  36.10  1.29
(3.88)  (0.15]
Post-reform  own  price  28.60  32.93
(1.51)  (2.25)
R2  0.77  0.76
F  5.38  7.60
Prob>F  0.0001  0.0001
a  The  figures  in  parentheses  are  t-ratios.
b This  is  the  total  rainfall  in  the  months  of  July-August  for  teff,  wheat,  and
barley;  August-September  for chick  peas;  July-August  for field  peas;  Nay-
July  for  horse  beans;  May-June  for  maise;  and  March  for  sorghum.- 27 -
Table  4:  PRICE ELASTICITY  OF SUPPLY  BASED  ON PRICE
COEFFICIENTS  FROM  (SUR)  ESTIMATES
Price  Elasticity  of
Chick  Field  Horse
Prices  Teff  Wheat  Barley  peas  peas  beans  Maize Sorghum
Teff  1.01  -0.84  -0.47
(1.2..)"




Chick  peas  0.42  0.06
(0.02)
Field  peas  -0.48
(-0.45)
Horse  beans  0.64
(1.16)
Maize  -0.10  -0.54
(0.38)
Sorghum  0.13  0.48
(0.50)
a  The  figures  in  parentheses  refer  to  the  elasticities  after  the  land  refonm.
The estimates  of own-price  coefficients  have positive  signs  except
for  field  peas  and  maize  which  are  not  statistically  significant.  Significant
cross-comodity  price  effects  are  also  found,  suggesting;  substitutability  and
complementarity  of crops.  These cross-commodity  effects  are statistically
significant  and suggest  substitution  between  wheat  and teff,  wheat  and  chick
peas,  and sorghum  and  maize.  The estimates  of the coefficient  for  the  post-
land reform  era (binary  A) have positive  signs  except  for barley  and field- 28 -
peas where the coefficient  is statistically  insignificant.  For other  crops,
the estimates indicate  that the land reform  and associated  institutional
reforms  lead to increases  in the responsiveness  of crop  production  to own-
price.  In the cases  of teff,  wheat,  horse  beans,  and sorghum,  the  estimated
positive  changes  in responsiveness  were  statistically  significant.  Given  the
observed  declines  in crop production  combined  with declines  in real crop
prices  after 1975,  the conclusion  can be drawn  that  reductions  in real  crop
prices played a  significant  role in  reduction  of crop production.  The
coefficient  of the  sowing  season  rainfall  is  positive  for  all  crops  indicating
the significant  role of preseason  precipitation  in determining  supply.  The
estimate  of the arable  land coefficient  has a positive  coefficient  for all
crops  except  horse  beans  where  it is  statistically  insignificant.  The  positive
coefficients  are statistically  significant  for  wheat,  chick  peas,  maize,  and
sorghum.  Agricultural  population  is interpreted  as a measure  of the  scale  of
household  demand for food. The estimated  coefficients  were statistically
significant  and negative  for teff,  chick  peas,  and  maize,  and positive  for
horse beans. Given population  growth  in excess  of 33X during  the sample
period,  these results  could be interpreted  as indicating  a strong  biased
effect  of rapid  growth  in  subsistence  household  demand  which  shifts  production
from crops s.ch as teff,  chick  peas,  maize,  and sorghum  to field  peas and
horse  beans.  Such  a change  in the  mix  of crops  is  consistent  with  the theory
of the  semi-subsistence  household,  as indicated  above.
The  coefficient  estimates  and elasticities  associated  with crop
prices  appear  correlated  with the  degree  of comnercialization  of crops.  Data
on the  proportion  of  each  crop  that  is  marketed  is  lacking,  but  the  literature
reviewed  seems  to  indicate  the  following ranking  of  crops  by
commercialization:- 29  -
Table  5:  PRICE  ELASTICITIES  AND  LEVEL  OF  COMMERCIALIZATION
Extent  of
Crop  Commercialization  B  t  ny
Teff  high  31.46  2.47  1.01
Wheat  high  59.90  4.43  0.88
Barley  high  2.08  0.06  0.22
Sorghum  high  31.64  2.34  0.48
Horse  beans  medium  7.29  1.39  0.64
Chick  peas  medium  4.92  1.84  0.42
maize  -7.SO  -0.43  -0.10
Field  peas  low  -3.40  -1.31  -0.48
where  B  is the coefficient  estimate,  t  refers  to t-ratio  and  ny  is the
own-price  elasticity  of supply.
Tables  3 and  4 indicate  that  own-price  response  of crops  was robust
with  respect  to  the  land  reform.  In the  cases  of teff,  wheat,  horse  beans  and
sorghum,  the reform  effect  on price  response  was statistically  significant;
however,  only small  quantitative  changes  in the elasticity  of supply  were
implied.  For  other  crops,  the  reform  effect  was  statistically  insignificant.
Empirical  results reported  for  Ethiopia  suggest significant  and
positive  own-price response  as well at  significant  cross-price  response
indicating  substitution  and complementarity  among crops.  These results  are
robust  to post-revolutionary  changes  and suggest  how smallholders  could  be
expected  to respond  to prices  in any movement  toward  a more open market
economy.
The implications  of these  results  for tax policy  can now be drawn
using  theoretical  results reported above. First, recognizing  that  the
elasticity  of production  of the  numeraire  price  (CPI)  is the  negative  of the- 30  -
sum of  the  price elasticities  of production,  and that the CPI may be
interpreted  as  the  price  of  marketed  consumer  goods,  the  production  elasticity
with respect  to the consumer  price  may be estimated  from  results  in Table  1
and  is  reported  in  Table  6.  With  these  results  the  implications  of  alternative
taxes  can  be  empirically  considered.
Table  6:  ESTIMATED  ELASTICITIES  OF  CROP  PRODUCTION
TO  CONSUMER  GOODS  PRICES
Production  Elasticity
with  Respect  to




Barley  +0 45
Chick  peas  +0.77
Field  peas  +0.42
Horse  beans  -0.05
Maize  -0.03
Sorghum  +0.06
a Post-reform  elasticity,  omitted  for  other  crops
due  to  insignificance.
Results  of the  household  theory  established  that a land tax would
unambiguously  increase  production  while  a transport  or production  tax would
reduce  production.  However,  the  signs  of  an  agricultural  revenue  tax  (a) and
a  consumption  tax  (y)  were  seen  as  dependent upon  the  production
elasticities  with respect  to own-price  and the consumption  goods pricep
respectively.  Results in Table 6  suggest  a  consumption  tax would reduce
production  of teff,  wheat,  hcrse  beans,  and  maize,  and  increase  production  of
barley,  chick  peas,  field  peas,  and  sorghum.  Prom  Table  4, positive  own-price
response  of production  suggests  an agricultural  revenue  tax would reduce- 31  -
agricultural  production  of  all  crops  except  field  peas  and  maize.
The relative  magnitudes  of elasticities  reported  provide  a basis  for
predicting  the magnitudes  of production  response  to changes  in these  taxes.
Table  4 suggests  teff  and  wheat  production  would  be reduced  by roughly  twice
the  amount of  chick  peas,  horse  beans, or  sorghum in  response  tc  an
agricultural  revenue  tax.  By comparing  Tables  4 and  6, the  output  effect  of
agricultural  revenue  and  consumption  taxes  are  seen  to  vary  across  crops  and
in  some  cases,  e.g.,  chick  peas,  to be of similar  orders  of  magnitude.  These
results  highlight  the importance  of considering  the  heterogeneous  effects  of
price and tax policy across  output (Y) with respect  to the agricultural
revenue  tax  and  the  consumption  tax.- 32  -
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